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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to construct theoretical models which help to shed light
on the recent criticisms of volatile investment flows. We do not make any empirical
attempt to establish the existence or gauge the importance of the adverse effects of
volatile investment flows nor do we make any implicit claims regarding the role of such
flows in recent exchange rate crises. Instead we simply assume the existence of fickle
outside investors and examine the consequences for the economy in the context of two
partial equilibrium endogenous growth models.
In our first model, the scale of fickle outside investment funds traces out a mean-
variance tradeoff for the growth rate of the economy. In particular, the volatility of
these funds dissuades risk averse agents from risky entrepreneural activities. This
result opens up the possibility that some regulation of outside investment may increase
growth. Our second model involves increasing returns and multiple equilibria. In the
context of this model fickle investor behaviour can have very persistent and substantial
effects on both output growth and volatility.
2
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to focus on the potential mechamisms through which volatile in-
vestment flows might influence long run economic growth. In particular we outline two
endogenous growth models in which economic performance is adversely affected by the be-
havior of volatile investment flows or what we shall call “fickle investors”. While our thoughts
have been motivated by the recent volatility on international capital markets and the ensuing
discussion about the value of international capital flows, see e.g. Obstfeld (1998), Bhagwati
(1998) and Rodrik (1998), we stress that our models are not inherently “international” in
nature. As long as their assumptions seem justifiable, their conclusions are relevant to any
situation where outside funds are used to finance investment projects and the source of this
finance can display volatility. In other words our general insights may be as appropriate to
international financial crises as they are to consideration of sectoral investment flows such
as real estate speculators or investors in high technology industries in a closed economy.
Our goal is modest: to outline two reasonably simple dynamic models in which the
volatility of exogenous investment flows is linked to the growth rate of the economy. Ours is
a theoretical exercise. Whether or not volatile investment flows are empirically harmful for
growth is clearly critical for the relevance of our analysis. As yet no clear empirical results
have been established - Rodrik (1998) finds no relationship between capital controls/capital
account liberalization measures and growth across countries and Razin and Rose (1994)
do not find any strong links between capital market openness and business cycle volatility.
Bekaert and Harvey (1997) show some evidence that stock market volatility increases after
liberalization1. This suggests that one avenue through which fickle investors might lead
to lower growth is via the negative relationship between growth and volatility documented
by Ramey and Ramey (1995) and theoretically explored in this paper. Milesi-Ferretti and
Razin (1998) find little correlation between currency crashes and subsequent output growth
although their results reveal large differences across countries - clearly for some countries
currency crashes have a severe impact on subsequent economic growth. These empirical
ambiguities suggest that it may be useful to develop theoretical models which produce a
negative relationship between fickle investors and economic growth in order to formulate
more precise null hypotheses which may have more chance of leading to significant test
results. It is along this dimension that the present paper can be seen as a useful contribution
to the literature. Our own analysis suggests that it may be difficult to empirically isolate
the adverse effects of fickle international investors even if these effects are present.
The other issue which we do not attempt to address is the question of why are investment
1These results are however sensitive to model specification.
funds so volatile? We simply assume the existence of fickle investors and then examine their
macroeconomic implications and make no attempt at modelling their behavior endogenously.
As a result of assuming exogenous investor behaviour our models are partial equilibrium
in one very important dimension. There is an enormous literature which attempts to ex-
plain volatile investment market behavior as deviations from efficient market behavior which
makes reference to, amongst others, herd behavior, irrationality, incomplete information and
learning, speculative bubbles, multiple equilibria, etc. Likewise, investor behaviour may be
perfectly rational and its volatility the reaction to exogenous events elsewhere such as the
resolution of policy uncertainties, of changes in alternative investment opportunities or the
coordination of beliefs in a multiple-equilibrium situation. One example is the literature on
speculative attacks, see e.g. Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984), Obstfeld (1994).
Each of these explanations has the potential to produce a volatile supply of investment cap-
ital which is simply taken to be the starting point of our analysis. Our main reason for
focusing on exogenous investor behavior is our desire to understand the macroeconomic im-
plications of volatile investment flows rather than be diverted by having to account for the
exact cause of this volatility. If the endogeneity of investor behavior is an important part
of the mechanism whereby investment volatility adversely affects growth then our approach
may be misleading. Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (1998), Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(1998), Boldrin and Levine (1998) all outline models where such a mechanism is important.
However, the empirical work of Dumas (1994), Dumas and Solnik (1995), Eichengreen and
Rose (1998) and Frankel and Rose (1998) all suggest that factors exogenous to the recipient
country have a substantial role in driving investor flows (more particularly the level of inter-
est rates in developed nations and changes to international portfolio evaluations of exchange
rate risks) offering support for our assumption of the exogeneity of investment flows for the
recipient country.
What is distinctive about our paper is its focus on how fickle investors or volatile in-
vestment flows can have an adverse impact on the economy. Further, much of the existing
literature focuses on the conflict between policy authorities and private sector investment
flows. Instead our paper is entirely about how the volatility of private sector investment flows
can have adverse influences on the productive decisions of the private sector. Our analysis
reveals theoretical mechanisms whereby fickle investment flows can permanently lower the
growth rate of the economy as well as making fluctuations more volatile and persistent.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a partial equilibrium endogenous
growth model where entrepreneurs seek funding from outside fickle investors. Scaling up
outside funding generates a mean-variance tradeoff for growth: an unlimited scale of outside
funding is not desirable. This model then suggests that capital controls can be welfare
improving. In Section 3 we turn to another partial equilibrium endogenous growth model
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which is characterized by increasing returns and multiple equilibria. Focusing on the stable
equilibria permits analyzing the effect of volatile outside investors: we show how they lead
to persistent responses and volatility in economic growth. A final section concludes and an
appendix contains the detailed derivation of our results.
2 Fickle Investors and Reluctant Entrepreneurs
This section focuses on how the interaction between fickle investors and occupational choice
influences the long term growth of an economy. A partial equilibrium model of an economy
is presented, where entrepreneurial projects are financed both with internal savings as well
as by outside investors. An increase in the scale of outside investment boosts the growth of
the economy by increasing share prices and thereby the proportion of entrepreneurs in the
economy. However, this scale increase also scales up the volatity in share prices and so exert
an offsetting adverse effect on growth. Combining these two effects we demonstrate that
maximising the growth rate of the economy may involve some restrictions on fickle investors.
2.1 The Model
We assume that time is discrete t = 0, 1, 2, . . .and that in each period a continuum of agents
is born each of whom lives for two periods. In the first period, they supply one unit of labor.
They then make a personal investment decision: become an entrepreneur or an experienced
worker. If they become an entrepreneur they start a project which comes on line in their
second period of life. These new projects are tantamount to introducing new ideas or new
technologies into the production process, improving overall productivity. For simplicity
we assume the overall improvement in productivity is a pure externality which affects all
projects in operation. That is suppose 0 ≤ et ≤ 1 is the fraction of the population becoming
entrepreneurs in period t and let γt be the productivity of all projects producing in period
t. We assume
γt+1 = γt(1 + ψet) (1)
where ψ is a parameter which determines the growth impact of new projects. This as-
sumption regarding externalities is obviously important for any policy recommendations
emanating from this model but not for the comparative static results we derive regarding
how fickle investors affect growth. Let qt denote the total number of projects in operation
at date t. While knowledge never gets lost we assume that projects die with probability δ
3
so that
qt = (1− δ)qt−1 + et−1
If individuals choose not to be an entrepreneur they remain a worker and supply v efficiency
units of labor. The total amount of efficiency units of labor available at date t (that is the
young unexperienced and the old experienced non-entrepreneurs) is therefore
nt = 1 + ν(1− et−1)
where ν < 1 indicates that experience and old age means a loss in productivity, whereas
ν > 1 indicates a productivity gain: ν plays no further role other than allowing for some
parameter flexibility. We have assumed that inexperienced and experienced labor are perfect
substitutes.






















dtqt = (1− α)yt
For simplicity we assume agents only consume in the second period so that when young
they save their entire wage earnings. Further we assume they invest these resources entirely
by purchasing projects. However a proportion of projects are also purchased by outside
investors although this proportion is time varying and is the source of fickleness in our
model. Entrepreneurs and workers are prevented from buying other assets by assumption.
It is at this point that our model is most appropriate in an international context as this
assumption of incomplete markets may be most appealing there. The home bias in portfolio
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selection is a well documented fact at the international level, see Baxter and Jermann (1997)
for a recent restatement. No similar bias exists at the national or regional level. We therefore
have in mind for our model a small developing country with few overseas investments but
which receives large capital inflows from more developed nations. While these capital inflows
are large relative to the host nation they form only a small part of the portfolio of developed
countries. We stress that there is nothing “international” about our model otherwise: it
can equally well be understood as a partial equilibrium growth model of some sector with
the fickle investors coming from outside that sector, where one might want to appeal to
moral hazard issues as a reason for the nondiversifiability of entrepreneurial risk. We also
stress that our assumption about the absence of other asset markets for our entrepreneurs
and workers is anything but trivial. If entrepreneurs held well diversified portfolios, they
would be able to self-insure against fickle investment flows. Presumably then, resources by
fickle investors flowing into the economy would be offset by corresponding flows out of the
economy by the entrepreneurs and workers. Again, calling into memory recent events such
as the financial crisis in Russia and the political price to be paid by local entrepreneurs for
capital outflows may make this assumption more appealing in the international rather than
the sectoral context. Certainly the prevalence of restrictions on capital movements both in
and out of a country are far more numerous than within the national economy.
As a result of these assumptions labor income is used to purchase a proportion of projects
such that
ztwt = ptqt
where pt is the (ex-dividend) price per project and (zt−1)wt are the funds provided by outside
investors. We assume zt ∈ (0,∞) is random but stationary. This is not very restrictive. For
example, one may want to think of zt and its innovation variance σ2t as being drawn from a
stationary Markov process, allowing for homoskedastic fluctuations in zt as well as GARCH-
processes or stochastic volatility. More specifically, one may want to think of zt as a process
with small increases most of the time, interrupted by occasional sharp drops as a simple way
to capture financial crises. The fluctuations in zt and its variance reflect the impact of fickle
outside investors. In the case of no outside investors zt ≡ 1 and labor income is used to
purchase the entire stock of projects. If zt = 2, then the funds provided by outside investors
are as large as the funds saved by workers and entrepreneurs. If zt < 1, investors as a group
are selling the projects short2.
2This case creates no mathematical problems, but is admittedly hard to reconcile logically with our
portfolio restriction for entrepreneurs and workers.
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The return earned in period t+ 1 per unit invested in period t is given by
Rt+1 = (1− δ)
dt+1 + pt+1
pt
where the factor reflects the fraction of dying or unsuccessful projects in the diversified
portfolio of investors.
To make the choice of whether to become an entrepreneur or an experienced worker at
date t, the agent needs to reason as follows. As an entrepreneur, they will collect dividends











In comparison the total consumption of experienced workers is the sum of wage earnings
times any returns earned
c
(w)
t+1 = Rt+1wt + νwt+1
Let u(c) be the utility function for consuming when old then the fraction of agents becoming












t+1] + πtwt+1 (3)
(note that wt+1 is already known at date t).
This risk premium denotes the additional consumption required to compensate the en-
trepreneur for the additional riskiness of their occupational choice compared to the worker.
Note that we have written the risk premium to be proportional to a measure of wealth,
namely the second-period wage wt+1, which is plausible for utility functions which approx-
imate constant relative risk aversion. In order to examine the steady state of the model
we also need to make the following assumption (which for a very wide range of plausible












The model is analyzed in detail in Appendix A, here we only report some of the results.
To analyze the model, we shall first take πt as given and we shall later show how to calculate
it.





((1 + ν)(1− α) + ν(1− α)(1− δ)qt + αEt [zt+1]) (4)





((1 + ν)(1− α) − (ν + πt)α(1− δ)qt + αEt [zt+1]) (5)
A few remarks are in order. First, the dynamics of the model are very simple and take the
form of a first order difference equation, given a process for πt. Second, the autoregressive
coefficient for qt is the product of the fraction of surviving projects (1−δ) and the profitability
of projects (1−α) at πt = 0: if there are already lots of projects in operation in the economy
the relative return to being an entrepreneur rather than an experienced worker declines.
Third, the entrepreneurial decision is forward looking; et depending on financing conditions
next period when the entepreneur needs to sell the project (Et[zt+1]). Fourth, surprises in
outside financing (zt+1−Etzt+1) have no effect on the growth path of the economy but simply
result in a redistribution between existing entrepreneurs, workers and outside investors.
Finally, predictable changes in external financing have lasting effects. For instance suppose
zt ≡ z̄, except that Et0−1zt0 > z̄, i.e. a larger fraction of assets is expected to be held by
overseas investors at t0. In this case, the fraction of agents becoming entrepreneurs rises
in period t0 − 1, creating additional projects for the date t0, with convergence back to the
z̄-situation at the rate of (1 − α)(1 − δ) in the periods t > t0. Our model thus offers in
a simple way the persistent effects of changes in financial conditions that are the focus of
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Suarez and Sussman (1997) or
Ortalo-Magné and Rady (1998).
2.2 Capital Inflows and the mean effect
In order to solve for the steady state growth path, we make the simplifying approximation
that the entrepreneurial risk premium, πt, is a constant, π̄, which is independent of the state
of the economy or its parameters. On the steady state growth path the fraction of agents
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= 1 + ψē
which is obviously increasing in ē. To get a ballpark idea of the quantitative implications:
if there are no outside investors, z̄ ≡ 1, if there is no experience premium for older workers
ν = 1, if the labor share is α = 2/3 and if the depreciation rate δ is ten percent then
ē = 4/21, i.e. approximately 19 percent of all agents become entrepreneurs. With ψ = 0.2,
this results in 4% annual growth.
Under Assumption A1 applied to πt ≡ π̄, (6) yields the following comparative static
results. Across economies with different parameters in steady state, the fraction of agents ē
choosing to become entrepreneurs and thus the growth factor ḡ is
1. increasing in the fraction E[z] of assets held by outside investors,
2. for π ≈ 0, decreasing in the experience premium ν,
3. for π̄ > −ν, increasing in the depreciation rate δ,










5. constant with respect to everything else.
These results are not surprising. With higher outside financing each project will be sold
at a higher price, making it more attractive to become an entrepreneur. With a higher
experience premium, the opportunity costs of becoming an entrepreneur rise, explaining the
second result. With a higher depreciation rate, there will be fewer projects around in total,
if the fraction of entrepreneurs were to remain constant, thus raising the marginal product
of a new project, and making it more attractive to become an entrepreneur, explaining the
third result. For the fourth result, an increased labor share makes the choice to become an
entrepreneur relatively less attractive in the absence of outside funds, and thus depresses
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growth. When outside funds are present, an increase in the parameter α also implicitely
increases these funds, as we have assumed them to be proportional to wage earnings for
simplicity of algebra: when the scale of outside funds is large enough, this effect will dominate
and increase growth.
2.3 Capital inflows and the variance effect
To investigate the impact of fickle investors on entrepreneurial decision making, we need to
study the relationship between the variance of zt and the entrepreneurial risk premium πt





and assume all random variables to be both bounded and small. Rather than numerical
simulation, we prefer to use analytical approximations in order to stress as clearly as possible
the intuition behind our model. The key device is to rely on a second order approximation
to marginal utility for deriving a first order approximation for the risk premium3.
Let σt,z be the variance of zt+1, conditional on information up to and including date t.
Likewise, let σt,c(e) be the conditional variance of c
(e)
t+1 and σt,c(w) the conditional variance of
c
(w)


























Equation (7) confirms our earlier statement that the entrepreneurial risk premium is
positive. Note that qt and et are bounded. If, furthermore, qt+1 is strictly bounded from
below, qt+1 > q, and σ2t,z is bounded above, equation (8) shows that πt is bounded
4 as well.
3Canton (1997) applies a similar device to compare steady states in a different context.
4Note, that zt → 0 yields
πt → η
α
(1− δ)(1− α)qt+1 (1 + ν(1− et))
σ2t,z
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Equation (8) equates πt to an expression involving the exogenous random variables zt,
Et[zt+1] and σt,z, as well as the endogenous state variables qt and qt+1, noting that et follows
from equation (5). However, (8) is only an implicit equation in πt as both et and qt+1 depend
in turn on πt. Combining (8) with (4) and (5), one can derive an explicit quadratic equation
in πt which has exactly one economically meaningful solution, as long as σt,z is not too large.
This solution can be shown to be increasing in the relative risk aversion η as well as the
conditional fickleness variance σ2t,z. Further, it can be shown that equations (4), (5) and (8)
imply a cubic equation for the steady state value of q̄. Details can be found in appendix A.
2.4 The Mean-Variance Trade-off
Our results imply that there is a mean-variance trade-off with respect to the presence of fickle
investors. More outside investment has two opposing effects: it increases the growth rate of
the economy by providing entrepreneurs with a higher average sale price for their project,
and at the same time decreases the growth rate by scaring risk-averse agents away from
entrepreneurship into the relatively safer haven of employment due the increased variance of
the sale price.
Illustrating the nature of the trade-off requires numerical calculations. Table 1 provides
numerical results for a “baseline” parameterization, using ν = 1, α = 2/3, δ = 0.1, ψ = 0.2
and η = 5. We have varied z̄ as well as σz. The calculations are based on solving for the
entrepreneurial risk premium at the steady state and using the analytical approximations
above. One can easily see the increase in the growth rate due to an increase in z̄ as well
as the decrease in the growth rate due to an increase in σz. To see the trade-off even more
clearly assume that outside financing z − 1 is a scaled version of a random variable5 X,
z − 1 = λX, E[X] = 1,Var[X] = ξ2
Thus each extra unit of outside financing comes with ξ extra units of fickleness. If ξ = 1, so
that σz = 0.1 for z = 1.1 and σz = 0.2 for z̄ = 1.2, increases in outside financing always have
a positive effect on the growth rate in this table. If, however, ξ = 2, so that σz = 0.2 for
z̄ = 1.1 and σz = 0.4 for z = 1.2, then some outside financing z̄ = 1.1 increases the growth
rate, but more outside financing z̄ = 1.2 is detrimental to the growth rate. These results





5One may want to assume X > 0 to rule out net short sales by fickle investors.
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z̄ = 1.00 1.10 1.20
γ̄ ē γ̄ ē γ̄ ē
π σR π σR π σR
σz = 0 3.81 19.05 4.00 20.00 4.19 20.95
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σz = 0.1 3.76 18.81 3.96 19.78 4.15 20.74
1.31 10.38 1.18 9.45 1.07 8.68
σz = 0.2 3.62 18.10 3.82 19.11 4.02 20.10
5.48 20.72 4.92 18.88 4.44 17.34
σz = 0.3 3.38 16.91 3.59 17.97 3.81 19.03
13.29 31.01 11.83 28.25 10.61 25.95
σz = 0.4 3.04 15.19 3.27 16.36 3.50 17.50
26.64 41.22 23.38 37.55 20.72 34.50
Table 1: Model 1. This table provides numerical results for a “baseline” parameterization,
using ν = 1, α = 2/3, δ = 0.1, ψ = 0.2 and η = 5. We have varied z̄ as well as σz. The
calculations are based on solving for the entrepreneurial risk premium at the steady state.
All numbers are in percent.
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Figure 1: This figure shows the mean-variance tradeoff in model 1. The solid middle line
shows the overall growth rate, resulting from mixing the mean effect (straight upper line) with
the variance effect (curved lower line). The growth rate is maximized at the value λ, which
is indicated by a vertical line.
hold more generally for our model: the benefit to the growth rate of the economy due to
the mean effect of additional outside investment increases approximately linearly in λ, while
the costs due to the variance effect increase approximately quadratically in λ. Hence, the
growth rate of the economy is a hump-shaped function of the scale of outside investment.
The trade-off is visualized in Figure 1. The insight can clearly be seen with the help of
equations (6) and (8). Suppose first, that ξ = 0 (so only the mean effect is present, π = 0).
In that case, the steady state fraction ē of agents who decide to become entrepreneurs (and
thus the growth rate of the economy) linearly increases with λ. Suppose next, that E[X] = 0
rather than E[X] = 1, so that only the variance effect is present. Holding qt, qt+1 and et
constant, equation (8) shows π to be a linear function of σ2z and thus a quadratic function of
λ. Using this in equation (6) and taking a Taylor expansion there with respect to π shows
ē to be approximately quadratic in λ as well6.
6To do the full analysis, one would need to take into account the endogeneity of qt = qt+1 = et/δ = q̄ in
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η = 1 η = 2 η = 3
z̄ σz z̄ σz z̄ σz
γ̄ ē γ̄ ē γ̄ ē
π σR π σR π σR
ξ = 1 4.22 3.22 1.83 0.83 1.46 0.46
6.02 30.10 4.48 22.41 4.20 21.02
68.26 80.87 21.35 47.42 12.02 32.83
ξ = 2 1.32 0.63 1.14 0.28 1.09 0.18
4.09 20.45 3.94 19.69 3.89 19.47
8.32 50.11 3.71 25.69 2.35 17.16
ξ = 5 1.04 0.21 1.02 0.11 1.01 0.07
3.85 19.24 3.83 19.15 3.82 19.11
1.11 20.93 0.56 10.68 0.38 7.17
Table 2: Model 1. Optimal amount of outside financing, given that z̄ − 1 outside financing
creates fickleness shocks with standard deviation σz = ξ(z̄ − 1). The relative risk aversion η
as well as the volatility-to-mean ratio ξ have been varied.
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How large is the optimal scale of outside investment? We investigate this issue in table 2,
considering our model under different values for η and ξ. These simulations show that
the variance effect has the potential to be large and quantitatively significant even when
considering modest amounts of risk aversion and standard-deviation-to-mean ratios ξ. It
cannot therefore be dismissed as being of “second order” a priori.
3 Fickle investors and Increasing Returns.
The previous section outlined a model where fickle investors can be bad for growth if the
variance effect dominates. In this section we outline a very different model: an endogenous
growth model with increasing returns and multiple equilibria. We show how the volatility of
outside investors selects the stable among the two equilibria, and leads to persistent responses
in economic growth. In this model and in contrast to the model of section 2, the returns to
investing are tied down by an arbitrage condition.
3.1 The Model
The model is as follows. Time is discrete, t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. In each period, there is a stock of
operational projects qt: think of projects as blueprints or firm-specific knowledge, enabling its











Final goods production is organized by a sector of competitive firms, giving rise to the
usual project-specific demand function for the intermediate good. The intermediate good
producers are in monopolistic competition and maximize profits period by period by choosing
nt,i, taking into account the demand function for their good as well as the wage bill wtnt,i.




equation (8) to find the exact relationship between ē and λ in this case, but the argument should be clear
enough.
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Before completing the model by describing how new projects get introduced, we can
already perform a partial equilibrium analysis of the production decisions each period. As
all projects enter these decisions symmetrically we have
nt,i ≡ nt = 1/qt






Let dt be the profits generated per project. Since production of the final good is characterized
by constant returns to scale it is used in paying for the intermediate production goods xt,i.
The share αµ of the revenue for each project is used for paying wages, the rest is distributed
as dividends to the project owners
wt = αµYt
dtqt = (1− αµ)Yt
Note that the latter equation can also be written as








We can already see one feature of the model: if ω > 0 (i.e. aggregate increasing returns),
then a more quickly growing economy will lead to larger dividends per project.
The stock of projects changes via the introduction of new projects as well as the deteri-
oration of existing ones. Let et denote the new projects and let δ be the depreciation rate.
We postulate
qt = (1− δ)qt−1 + et
We assume there is an outside capital market with a fixed real interest factor R = 1 + r. We
furthermore assume that the country under consideration is small and its risk uncorrelated
with world market portfolio risk so that no risk premium is charged for the uncertain dividend
streams. With this, we can already compute an equation for the share price st of each new
project:





Potential new projects are owned by the entrepreneurs of the country under consideration
but need funds zt to become operational. The relationship between new project and start-up




where 0 < θ < 1. To get balanced growth in this model we need to impose the condition
1 = θ(ω + 1) (9)
and we assume this equality from here onwards. This is obviously a necessary but strong
assumption, typical of endogenous growth models with increasing returns. It allows us to
concentrate on the comparatively simple analysis of balanced growth paths.
The choice of zt is restricted by the opportunity costs of investing these funds elsewhere:















= θAzθ−1t st, (10)
This closes the model. Among the many differences to the model in section 2, this arbitrage
condition is perhaps the most important one. Investment behaviour here is no longer com-
pletely exogenous, but needs to satisfy a forward-looking constraint. The arbitrage condition
needs to stay satisfied even when we consider random fluctuations in investor behaviour.
The model is analyzed further in appendix B. Let γt = dt/dt−1 be the growth rate of


















If there is no uncertainty and ω > 0, then the right hand side of (10) is an increasing function
of γt+1. A plot of this relationship can be seen in Figure 2, using the base parameterization
of section 3.2. In this figure, there are two steady states γ̄L and γ̄H .
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Figure 2: This figure shows the multiple steady states in model 2 in its base parameterization,
plotting γt+1 − γt versus γt. Check the intersections with the horizontal line at zero. The
high growth steady state is approximately at γ̄H = 1.05, whereas the low growth steady state
is approximately at ¯gammaL = 1.00.
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In fact, this is a typical situation. It turns out that for interesting parameter values,















The local dynamics around each steady state can be studied more easily when examining
a linearized form of equation (11),











γ̂t + ut+1 (14)
where Et[ut+1] = 0.
For the two steady states, we typically have the following:
Low growth, dynamically unstable steady state: Here, steady state growth is low,
γ̄L < R
1−θ, and hence ϕ < 1. In this case, the dynamics in (14) are locally unstable -
any shock will lead to divergent dynamics.
High growth dynamically stable steady state: Here steady state growth is high,
γ̄H > R
1−θ, and hence ϕ > 1. In that case, the dynamics in (14) are locally stable in
the face of shocks. Shocks will lead to fluctuations in the growth rate.
The mechanism at work in producing these features is somewhat similar to the mechanism
in e.g. Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Boldrin and Rustichini (1994).
We are interested in studying the impact of shocks to investment behaviour. Given the
instability of the low growth steady state we therefore need to focus our attention on the
high growth stable steady state. Since we are interested in the effect of shocks to the funding
zt by investors we introduce ζ̂t as the log-deviation of zt/dt from its value along the balanced
growth path. Let
φt = ζ̂t − Et[ζ̂t]
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be the surprise movement in ζ̂t where we interpret φt as fickleness shocks which we assume





where χ = (1− δ)γ̄
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see Appendix B. These equations show, how much volatility in growth and stock market
prices will be caused by random fluctuations in the supply of outside investment funds in
the context of this model.
3.2 A numerical example
To study these issues in further detail we use specific numerical examples. As our base case
we use the paramterizations µ = 0.4, α = 0.7, δ = 0.09, R = 1.05 and A = 1. These numbers
are meant to be suggestive rather than represent the end product of a serious calibration
exercise. That said the numbers are not randomly chosen but intended to represent plausible
values for an economy measured at an annual frequency. This base parameterization leads
to the solution ω = 0.8, θ = 0.56,γ̄L = 1.00 and γ̄H = 1.05, ρH = 11.15, 1/ϕH = 0.94 and
σγ/σ = 1.11 and σρ/σ = 6.6, see also figure 2. The model serves to amplify the volatility of
fickle investment flows for both growth and the price-dividend ratio, especially for the latter.
This base parameterization also leads to very persistent responses in the growth rate, with
the effect of a shock dying out at the rate 1/φ. Table 3 shows how our results vary when we
alter µ and α. We vary µ in such a way that ω takes evenly stepped values. For low levels
of increasing returns ω, growth rates display a less persistent response but a rather large
volatility. Conversely, as increasing returns become more substantial the autocorrelation in
growth rates rises but volatility declines.
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α α = 0.55 α = 0.7
ω γ̄L ρ̄L ω γ̄L ρ̄L
µ θ γ̄H ρ̄H θ γ̄H ρ̄H
1/λH σγ/σ σρ/σ 1/λH σγ/σ σρ/σ
0.25 0.98 6.52 0.10 0.99 7.07
µ = 0.556 0.80 1.12 30.30 0.91 1.12 36.54
0.61 4.42 6.29 0.30 28.59 11.51
0.40 0.97 6.15 0.25 0.98 6.52
µ = 0.513 0.71 1.11 25.16 0.80 1.12 32.95
0.73 2.16 5.15 0.60 4.51 6.24
0.55 0.96 6.08 0.40 0.97 6.14
µ = 0.476 0.65 1.09 19.57 0.71 1.11 27.30
0.81 1.43 4.84 0.73 2.19 5.08
0.70 0.98 6.52 0.55 0.96 6.01
µ = 0.444 0.59 1.07 13.96 0.65 1.10 21.27
0.89 1.12 5.29 0.80 1.45 4.73
Table 3: Model 2. Variations in the parameterization and corresponding results.
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4 Conclusions
Our aim in this paper has been to examine theoretically whether the fickle behavior of
investors can adversely affect growth. We have made no attempt to model this investor
fickleness but take it as exogenously given although motivated by reference to the many
strands in the macroeconomic and finance literature which justify volatile investment flows.
We also stress that we make no statement regarding the empirical importance of fickle
investors or their role in provoking any particular financial crisis. Instead we articulate two
partial equilibrium endogenous growth models in which fickle investors have an important
and potentially adverse influence on the economy. In our first model there exists a mean-
variance trade-off which implies that increases in the scale of fickle investment beyond some
point are not good for economic growth. The trade-off result at the heart of this model
also suggests that empirically documenting either beneficial or adverse influences of fickle
(international) investment on growth may be difficult. In our second model we introduced
fickle investors as a source of uncertainty in a model with increasing returns and an arbitrage
condition for outside investors. We show how fickleness shocks trigger persistent responses
in the growth rate and volatility in growth in general.
Clearly much remains to be done and two particular issues need to be addressed. First,
we need a detailed empirical assessment of whether increasing the scale of outside investment
benefits or hinders growth and the conditions under which either effect works, taking into
account the possible nonlinearities presented here. Second, progress on the theory side will
depend on endogenizing the fickle behavior of the investors. We believe that the investiga-
tion at hand shows that such future work is desirable. Our theoretical analysis raises the
possibility that the most important adverse effects of volatile investment flows may not be




A Solving the model of section 2
The arbitrage equation for the decision as to whether to become an entrepreneur or an




t+1 + πtwt+1] or
dt+1 + Et[pt+1] = (ν + πt)wt+1
Note that dt+1, wt+1 and - for the next step - nt+1 are known at date t. Multiply with



























((1− δ)qt + et)
Solving this for et delivers equation (5) and thus also equation (4) with et = qt+1− (1− δ)qt.
To calculate the steady state in equation (6), use δq̄ = ē and solve. The comparative static
results of section 2.2 follow immediately.











where εt+1,c(e) and εt+1,c(w) have mean zero, conditional on information up to and including






































A similar expression can be obtained for c
(w)
t+1. Comparing these two expressions and solving
for πt yields (7). To show πt > 0, we need to show that σt,c(e) > σt,c(w). To that end, rewrite










εt+1,R = Rt+1 −Et[Rt+1]
Positivity of πt now follows immediately, since pt/(1− δ) > 0.






εt+1,z = zt+1 − Et[zt+1],











Crunching a bit further yields equation (8).
To establish the mean-variance tradeoff result we proceed as follows. To turn (8) into an
explicit expression for πt, one needs to take into account the dependence of qt+1 and et on πt
as given in equations (4) and (5). Note that (ν+πtα)qt+1 and (ν+πtα)et are linear functions
in πt. Thus, equation (8) with the denominator of the right hand side, and multiplying the
result with (ν+πtα)2 yields a quadratic equation in πt, which can be solved, using the usual
formulas. Explicitly, one gets
Atπ
2
t +Btπt + Ct = 0 (18)
where


















(αν(1− δ)qt − (1 + ν)(1− α)− αEt[zt+1]
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Even though there are two solutions, only one of them is economically meaningful. First
note, that for σt,z = 0, one of the solution is πt = 0, whereas the other solution is πt < 0,
which is not meaningful. Generally, as long as σt,z is not too large, we have At > 0, Bt > 0
(because there must be a solution at σt,z = 0) and Ct ≤ 0. Hence, we find that exactly
one of the two solutions is nonnegative. This is the economically meaningful one due to the
positivity of πt, see equation (7).
To show that πt is increasing in the relative risk aversion η as well the conditional fick-
leness variance σ2t,z, note that ∂qt+1/∂πt+1 < 0 and that ∂et/∂πt+1 < 0. Thus, implicit
differentiation of (8) delivers the result.
Finally, to calculate the steady state from equations (4), (5) or (6) and (8), exploit ē = δq̄






q̄ (χ5 + χ6q̄ + χ7q̄2)
for some coefficients χi, i = 1, . . . , 7. Multiplying both equations with their respective de-
nominators leads to the two equations
π̄q̄ = χ1 − χ2q̄
π̄q̄
(
χ5 + χ6q̄ + χ7q̄
2
)
= χ4 + χ5q̄
Use the first equation to replace π̄q̄ in the second to obtain a third-order polynomial in q̄.
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B Solving the model of section 3
The behavior of the economy can be summarized by the following four equations,
dt = (1− αµ)q
ω
t (19)






t + (1− δ)qt−1 (21)
R
r
= θAzθ−1t st (22)
Since this is a growing economy, these equations are not yet in a form suitable for dynamic
analysis. It turns out to be convenient to consider transformations of the variables instead.






















keeping in mind equation (9). We shall call this variable the funding ratio as it is the ratio
of a (transformation) of the funding zt to the dividends dt paid per project.
With these new definitions, the second equation (19) can be written as






















The dynamics can be collapsed into a single equation in γt. To do so, solve (24) for ξt
and use it as well as equation (25) to express both ξt and ρt as functions of γt. Replacing ξt
and ρt in equation (23) and multiplying with common terms yields




























and thus equation (11).














as claimed in the text. This equation needs to be solved for γ̄: we will use graphical and
numerical solution methods.
Given some steady state γ̄, define for abbreviation purposes
χ = (1− δ)γ̄−1/ω











To analyze the dynamics, loglinearize equation (26) around a steady state. After some
calculations, one obtains





















Thus, let ζ̂t be the log-deviation of zt/dt from its value along the balanced growth path7 and






and thus equation (15) and equation (16).
7Note that zt/dt is in general not constant along the balanced growth path, but ξt = z
1−θ
t /dt is. Of
course, we can still calculate zt/dt along the balanced growth path, and find logdeviations from it.
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